

NSC BRIEFING

12 November 1958

25X1

**MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS**

- I. Jordanian King Husayn's use of Monday's plane incident for propaganda purposes--initially effective at home--may later backfire, since his plane in fact did not have clearance for the flight over Syria.
  - A. Hammarskjold has advised Jordan not to complain to the UN, and has counselled Nasir to apologize, even though the UAR was technically in the right.
  - B. Husayn now intends to postpone his trip another ten days or so, but Prime Minister Rifai is urging him to wait until spring.

25X1

- II. In Iraq, the round-up of pro-UAR civilian and military personalities launched after Arif's recent return and arrest--continues.
  - A. This has seriously damaged the Baath party and left the Communists the best organized (but not largest) force moving "street" elements.
    1. The Baath reportedly is now changing tactics, and will hereafter criticize the Qasim regime and clash openly with Communist demonstrators.

25X1

C. Despite the deterioration in Iraqi-UAR political relations, joint military planning re Israel apparently continues.

III. Arab-Israeli tensions are still acute and border incidents are likely, but there are no new significant military developments.

- IV. In the Sudan, the Khalil government is still considering forceful action to curb the opposition and subversion if it does not succeed in strengthening its hand by parliamentary means.
- A. The possibility of a Khalil-led coup after parliament convenes on 17 November is an open secret in Khartoum, with the opposition charging that US-UK inspiration is likely.
- V. Area developments seem to have Nasir depressed, confused, frustrated.
- A. He again emphasized his belief that Communists are strongest element in Iraq, but he does not intend to oppose them because other elements are too "weak."
- B. He still sees himself as the primary target of US-UK-French conspiracy, with the Soviets his last available refuge.
- C. Amb. Hare feels Nasir may have some kind of new deal with USSR which as yet unknown to us.
- VI. In Iran, dangers to the regime continue, complicated by shifting forces in the Arab states.

25X1

- B. Iran's relations with the USSR are at lowest point in three years, and we believe some new and forceful Soviet measures against Iran must be expected.
1. On 31 October Moscow strongly protested the alleged signing of a US-Iranian military agreement "aimed at USSR," and cancelled the planned Voroshilov visit.
  2. On 10 November, following Iran's rejection of the protest, KHRUSHCHEV WARNED THAT MOVES AIMED AT "TRANSFORMING IRAN INTO the Soviet ambassador left Tehran for consultations. US MILITARY BRIDGEHEAD" WILL BE CONSIDERED "HOSTILE ACT."
  3. The Soviets have pointedly cited the treaty of 1927 in which the USSR and Iran agree to take no part in alliances or agreements directed against the other's territory.
    - (a) A 1921 treaty provides that under certain conditions the USSR may send troops into Iran if this is deemed necessary for Soviet defense.
- C. The Shah is initiating reforms (anti-corruption, land distribution, etc.) in an effort to increase his regime's domestic popularity.
1. Opposition to the reforms will be strong among those benefiting from the status quo, and only partial implementation is likely.
  2. Thus far reports are conflicting as to the effect of the reform program on the Shah's popularity.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000070004-5

Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000070004-5